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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD W. BASFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890281-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree 
felony in the district court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the mens rea of possession of a stolen 
vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1988) is intent to 
procure or pass title as stated in the statute? A reviewing 
court has a duty to interpret a statute according to the plain 
meaning of its terms, and where the language of a statute is 
clear, one need not look beyond the clear language of the statute 
to determine its meaning. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-106; 76-1-
104(2) & (3) (1990); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 485 (Utah 
1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The provisions of the pertinent statutes are set forth 
in the argument portion of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a stolen 
vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-1-112 (1988); and failure to respond to an officer's signal or 
command, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-13.5 (1988) (R. 6). Defendant pled guilty to count two and 
does not raise any issues regarding that plea on appeal. The 
parties stipulated to the facts on count one, possession of a 
stolen vehicle, and submitted the matter to Judge Leonard Russon 
of the Third District Court for a decision (R. 108 at 4). Judge 
Russon found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle 
on March 9, 1989 (R. 108 at 11-12). On April 3, 1989, Judge 
Russon placed defendant on probation for the third degree felony 
and required him to serve 60 days on work release in jail, among 
other conditions (R. 108 at 20-21). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts in this case were stipulated to by the 
parties. Defendant accurately recounts the stipulated facts in 
his brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant incorrectly reads a mens rea element of 
intent to permanently deprive into § 41-1-112 that is not 
contained in the statute. The mens rea of intent to procure or 
pass title is clearly stated in the statute. In this case no 
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evidence was presented on this element. The State agrees for 
this reason that § 41-1-112 was incorrectly applied to defendant 
and joins defendant's request that he be convicted of joyriding 
under S 41-1-109. The State disagrees, however, that the degree 
of defendant's offense is a class A misdemeanor. The judge found 
that defendant did not return the truck to its owner within 24 
hours and that his intent to abandon the truck was not the same 
as returning the truck. Joyriding is a third degree felony 
unless the actor returns the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours 
of the time it was taken. Defendant is guilty of a third degree 
felony under § 41-1-109. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF INTENT TO PROCURE OR 
PASS TITLE TO A VEHICLE IS CLEARLY STATED IN 
§ 41-1-112 AND THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
NEITHER THE READING OF THE STATUTE URGED BY 
DEFENDANT NOR THAT URGED BY THE STATE BELOW. 
Defendant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 
(1988)(amended 1989) allows the State to convict him of 
possession of a stolen vehicle if the State proves that he 
possessed a vehicle knowing it was stolen or unlawfully taken 
with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. 
Defendant asserts that even though this intent element is not 
expressly contained in the statute, it must be read into the 
elements of the crime to distinguish possession of a stolen 
vehicle from joyriding. He further asserts that he should be 
convicted of what he terms the lesser included offense of 
joyriding under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1988), because there 
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was no evidence or insufficient evidence of intent to permanently 
deprive. The State disagrees that intent to permanently deprive 
is an element of § 41-1-112, but agrees that defendant should not 
have been convicted under this section for other reasons. 
Section 41-1-112 provided in 1988 that: 
Any person who, with intent to procure or 
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has 
reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers 
possession of the same from or to another, or 
who has in his possession any vehicle which 
he knows or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not a 
peace officer engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty as such officer, is 
guilty of a felony. 
This section requires the mens rea element of intent to procure 
or pass title. The list that follows includes persons who, with 
that intent, commit any of the enumerated acts. The punctuation 
of the provision cannot be read to distinguish persons in 
possession from those who receive or transfer vehicles. There is 
no reason to read into the statute the additional mens rea 
element propounded by defendant that a person in possession of a 
stolen vehicle must also intend to permanently deprive the owner 
of its use. Traditional tenets of statutory construction do not 
require the Court to look beyond the clear language of the 
statute to add elements not explicitly contained in the statute 
because this Court can determine the fair import of its terms 
from the face of the provision. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
485 (Utah 1988). 
The State acknowledges that in the trial court the 
prosecution misread the statute to proscribe possession of a 
vehicle which the actor knows or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken. This reading of the statute is 
incorrect. If a person possesses a vehicle knowing or having 
reason to believe that it was unlawfully taken, without any 
further mens rea, that person has not violated § 41-1-112. 
On the other hand, it would be error to read the 
statute as defendant reads it because then the elements of § 41-
1-112 would parallel the elements of theft by receiving, 
retaining or disposing of a stolen vehicle under Utah Code Ann. 
SS 76-6-408 and -412 (1990). The elements of theft by receiving, 
retaining or disposing of an operable motor vehicle, a second 
degree felony, under these statutes are: (1) receiving, retaining 
or disposing of a vehicle which is the property of another, (2) 
knowing it was stolen or believing that it probably was stolen, 
(3) with a purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle. These 
elements are indistinguishable from those advocated by defendant 
as the proper elements of § 41-1-112. Consequently, this Court 
should not construe § 41-1-112 as defendant suggests that it 
should be construed, but should simply read it as written to 
require the mens rea of intent to procure or pass title to the 
vehicle. 
This Court must construe § 41-1-112 consistently with 
legislative intent. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 485. The Utah Supreme 
Court has already stated that the legislative intent was to 
prevent the stealing and trafficking in stolen motor vehicles. 
State v. Porter, 28 Utah 2d 364, 502 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1972). 
While the theft by receiving statute deals with people who 
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receive, retain or dispose of stolen vehicles it does not target 
the conduct involved in titling vehicles under false pretenses as 
does § 41-1-112. Thus, § 41-1-112 cannot be read to proscribe 
the same criminal behavior as § 76-6-408. 
The State agrees with defendant that this case should 
be remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction for joyriding 
under § 41-1-109. See State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 
(Utah 1985)(Supreme Court reversed conviction of crime defendant 
charged with and ordered entry of judgment for crime committed); 
see also State v. Bindrup# 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985). 
Given that the State agrees that defendant would 
properly have been prosecuted under § 41-1-109, the only 
remaining issue is what is the degree of defendant's crime. This 
is not a question of sufficiency of the evidence, but one of 
statutory interpretation. Defendant asserts that he committed a 
class A misdemeanor because he was caught within 24 hours of the 
unlawful taking and he intended to abandon the truck near where 
it was taken. His assertion is mistaken. Section 41-1-109 
provides: 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized 
control over a vehicle, not his own, without 
the consent of the owner or lawful custodian 
and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of 
the vehicle, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third 
degree felony if the actor does not return 
the vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian 
within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unauthorized control. 
(3) The consent of the owner or legal 
custodian of a vehicle to its control by the 
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actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's 
consent on a previous occasion to the control 
of the vehicle by the same or a different 
person. 
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party 
to or an accomplice in, an unauthorized 
taking or driving is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Under this section, joyriding is a third degree felony unless the 
actor returns the vehicle within 24 hours. Defendant did not 
return the truck to its owner. Instead, he fled from the police 
officer who attempted to stop him and stated only that he 
intended to abandon the truck near where it was taken. As Judge 
Russon ruled, this is not the same as returning the truck to the 
owner within 24 hours which the statute requires the actor to do 
to obtain the advantage of the lesser charge. 
Even if abandonment near where the truck was taken 
could be construed as return of the truck as defendant urges, 
intent to abandon is not the same as abandoning the truck near 
where it was taken within 24 hours. Construing the language of 
the statute according to the fair import of its terms reveals 
that the actor must actually return the truck to its owner within 
24 hours to obtain the advantage of the lesser charge. Intent to 
return the vehicle is not sufficient. Judge Russon was correct 
in his assessment that defendant was guilty of a third degree 
felony even under § 41-1-109. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to remand this case to the district court for entry of a judgment 
convicting defendant of joyriding, a third degree felony, under § 
41-1-109. 
DATED this ^ > day of May, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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\^y Assistant Attorney General 
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